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Abstract
Two opposing forces reshaped knowledge networks in ‘rust belt’ communities over the course
of the 1980s and 1990s.  On the one hand, large industrial companies which for generations had
stood at these places’ economic, social and intellectual cores attempted to reinvigorate their own
innovation processes by reaching out beyond the parochial boundaries of locales in which they
resided to tap into what was seen as a richer set of conversations taking place in Europe, Asia
and in the coastal regions of the U.S.  But for the communities they inhabited, these actions
posed a significant threat.  Already stung by massive job losses, the notion that their core
companies might also move processes of innovation elsewhere as well threatened not only to
undermine economic wellbeing, but of the cities’ identities as well.  In response, community
leaders developed strategies—often linked local universities—designed to reinvigorate the quality
of conversations taking place in locals.  
This paper analyses the experiences of two well-matched places that were simultaneously
subjected to these forces.  Until the 1980s, Akron, Ohio was the “tire capital of the world.”
Today, not a single tire is today produced in the city.  Yet, many of the companies—or at least
parts of them—remain located there and have shifted emphasis to advanced polymers, the
general class of materials which include synthetic rubber, fibers and engineered plastics.
Economic development efforts in the city have been based around attempts to build a new
community of innovation around these technologies.  Rochester, New York was home to several
internationally prominent companies in optical-electronics.  In the 1980s, these companies
moved significant parts of the production process elsewhere and shifted investments in an effort
to diversify portfolios.  Similarly, they have also made an attempt to transition from a
dependence on mass produced consumer opto-electronics to higher technology areas including
lasers, semi-conductors and photonics.  
Drawing on both historical matched-pairs comparison and a unique network analysis of co-
authored scientific papers, this paper explores the particular trajectories knowledge networks in
the cities have taken and how the particular actions of local have had concrete impacts on
outcomes.  In doing so, the paper sheds light on how communities can influence the trajectory
of economic change through concerted attention to organizing and relationship building.
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1. Introduction
Two opposite forces were acting within “rust belt” communities to reshape local knowledge networks
in the 1980s and 1990s.  On the one hand, companies were pushing outward in order to tap into
global flows of information and knowledge; a goal which meant distancing themselves from the
narrow set of parochial relationships in which they had been embedded up until that point (Bluestone
and Harrison 1986).  On the other, communities were attempting to maintain their place as nodes in
the global network of knowledge, ideas and people associated with what one might call “the creative
class” (Castells 2000; Florida 2000; Cooke 1991).  To do so, community leaders sought to enact
policies that would build on existing pools of knowledge and localized networks in order to facilitate
and reinvigorate the quality of conversations taking place within their own borders (Asheim 1996;
Morgan 1997; Storper 1995).
The two forces implied very different trajectories for knowledge networks within communities.
One would expect the effect of the companies’ actions to lead to a thinning out of local
relationships.  While companies located in the same place may draw from a common pool of
employees and specialized services, but in terms of trading relationships and, most importantly
in terms of their intellectual and creative relationships, their most important partners should be
found elsewhere on the global scene and certainly, at least, outside of any one particular region
(Markusen 1999).  On the other hand, there are in fact only a limited number of places in which
the most exciting and most important conversations can take place and these are places where
companies congregate in order to tap into vibrant knowledge networks.  Thus, in communities
that are particularly successful at developing the right milieu should find the quality and density
of local ties increasing over time rather than thinning out (Castells 2000).   
This paper analyzes the experiences of two places that were simultaneously subjected to these
opposing forces in the 1980s: Akron, Ohio and Rochester, New York.  Beginning in the 1970s,
companies with which these cities had become closely identified in the 20th century began
reaching outside of their home community to find sources of innovative ideas.  But in doing so,
the companies’ actions posed a threat to their home communities.  In particular, communities
feared they would lose further ground to places in the “subelt” and on the coasts that were
quickly gaining reputations as host to more interesting, more innovative conversations
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(Bluestone and Harrison 1982).  Community leaders in both places responded to this threat by
enacting a set of policy interventions which were designed at a minimum to maintain the
knowledge base that had been built up over several generations.  More ambitiously, they aimed
to reinvigorate the quality of conversations among firms in ways that might approximate (or
recapture) the creative cacophony that prevailed in the emerging ‘high-tech’ hotspots.  
The bulk of these efforts were based around building partnerships between industry and local
universities.  By channeling access to research and development seed funds through universities,
states hoped to build on universities’ strong reputations in the community and their apparent
pools of innovation-oriented resources to help upgrade innovation processes in these
communities.  However, how universities may or may not play in doing so is not necessarily clear.
Universities have been identified as organizations whose actions and interactions can help to
create “institutional thickness” (Amin and Thrift 1992; 1994) and “institutional capacity” (Phelps
and Tewdwr-Jones 1998).  As such they may be thought of as increasing overall stocks of “social
capital” or social connectedness (Portes 1998; Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993; Woolcock 2000)
with the university acting mainly as a catalyst and facilitator, but not necessarily a primary “hub.”
On the other hand, universities may be in a position to act as a bridge filling the structural holes
that exist among disconnected actors in communities (Burt 1992) and, in doing so, help to
efficiently channel the kinds of tacit knowledge necessary for innovation.  
Twenty years later, it is possible both to assess the impact of these opposing forces on
communities and of the particular role universities may or may not have played within them by
analyzing and comparing how patterns of conversations have evolved in these two places.  To
do so, this paper draws on a unique source of empirical data: networks of co-authored scientific
papers.  Many science-based companies have found it in their interest to encourage employees to
publish findings in scientific journals.  Indeed, the best and brightest potential employees actually
pay a premium in terms of wages in order to do so because of the prestige and satisfaction
associated having one’s work appreciated by one’s peers (Stern, 1998).  Publications can also
result from collaborations across companies whether through informal interactions or the result
of formal partnerships.  This is likely to be particularly true when collaborations involve
university partners for whom publications are, of course, the coin of the realm.  Many
universities, in fact, make the potential for such publications a prerequisite for engaging in
collaborations in the first place.   
Safford – Searching for Silicon Valley DRAFT: Comments Welcome
June 8, 2003
5
By analyzing the evolving patterns of collaboration in these two well matched cities over this
critical period of time, it becomes possible to gain insight into several important questions.  The
first is simply: What has been the balance achieved between the opposing impulses of outward
looking companies and the attempts of localities to invigorate the local scene?  Interestingly, two
different answers emerge from this investigation.  Today, Akron’s major companies are far less
parochial than they once were, but their new found cosmopolitanism has come mainly as a result
of large companies engaging in conversations well outside the region.  In Rochester, the overall
proportion of conversations taking place within the region itself has actually increased.
Rochester’s major industrial companies are more likely today than in the past to collaborate with
local organizational actors—particularly local universities.  Local universities, in turn, are today
more likely to be engaged in conversations with small, entrepreneurial companies.  Despite the
fact that the large local firms have reached out to establish ties elsewhere (famously so, in the
case of Xerox and its Palo Alto Research Center), the city’s networks have become far more
vibrant than they were in the past.   
Because the cases were selected in such a way as to facilitate comparison, we can probe further
into both the cases and the consequences of these different trajectories to shed light on several
other questions as well.  First, to the extent that one thinks of the pattern and quality of
relationships in a community as reflecting is stock of “social capital” (Putnam 1993; Portes and
Sensenbrenner 1993; Woolcock 1998)  then these data provide evidence to correlate this concept
with concrete, socially beneficial, outcomes.  Indeed, the data make it possible to see how social
capital has had an impact on one important outcome in particular: levels of entrepreneurship in
the two communities.  Specifically, because the universities took approaches to engaging industry
that essentially conform to the two ways in which theory suggests—that is, institutional and
“social capital” building versus structural holes bridging—the data actually help us to understand
how community and state actions help shape outcomes.  In doing so, the longitudinal and
qualitative nature of the research allow for insight into how state actions can (and possible
should) contribute to building social capital (Evans 1996).  
The paper proceeds as follows.  The next section provides a (relatively lengthy) discussion of the
methods.  The second section establishes the context with a brief history of the two cities’
industries and of the technologies with which they are identified.  The network analysis follows
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in the third section with data on the evolution of knowledge networks in the two places.  The
fourth section discusses the impact these changes have had on how innovations are produced in
the cities.  The paper concludes with some tentative insights that emerge from this analysis on
processes of institutional change.
2. Methods
Following Markusen (1999), the principal assumption of this research is that organizations’
strategies create the character of regional economies hosting them, not the other way around.
However, it is also assumed that these strategies emerge from a negotiated order in which any
one organization’s strategies necessarily emerge and evolve in relationship to the strategies of the
organizations with which they interact (Nelson and Winter 1983).  In seeking to understand how
knowledge networks have evolved it is necessary both to gain a sense of the unique perspectives
and constraints organizational actors bring to the process of crafting strategies and of the
environment in their sense making takes place (Weick 1973).  
To do so, this research combines two methodological approaches which, although
complementary, have only been rarely used in conjunction with each other.  The first is
historical-comparison based on the method of similarity (Skocpol and Somers 1980).  Under
ideal conditions, the method of similarity compares two contexts that are similar with respect to
all potential explanations except for (a) the variable one is trying to explain and (b) the proposed
explanation for those outcomes.  In reality, of course, it is never possible to achieve an exact
match.  Many mitigating circumstances inevitably muddy the water.  Nevertheless, comparative
approach is not intended necessarily to “prove” a given finding.  Rather it is simply to present
cases in such a way as to allow insights to emerge; the approach strikes a middle ground between
richly detailed, but non-generalizable case methods and sterile, thought apparently more rigorous
‘big n’ analysis.  The key is careful case selection and a full accounting of the similarities and
differences between cases.  The first part of this section therefore establishes the basis on which
the cases are to be compared.  The section that follows then describes the methods used in
collecting historical and interviews-based data on the recent experiences of these two places.
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The second methodological approach employed is network analysis.1  An assumption that
underlies this research is that conversations matter in the process of innovation.  Furthermore, it
is assumed that it is not only the quantity or even the quality of conversations that matters; their
also, vitally, the pattern and structure as well.  The degree to which one comes into contact with
information that is different from what one already knows is determined, in part, not only by the
conversations one has, but also by the conversations one’s interlocutors have as well
(Granovetter 1973).  Moreover, one’s positions within the overall structure of conversations in a
community can carry both responsibilities and opportunities depending, for instance, on whether
that position allows one to play a “brokerage” role potentially linking two pools of knowledge
and language that are otherwise disconnected (Fernandez and Gould 1994).  Network analysis is
ideally suited to gaining the overarching view of the pattern of conversations within a
community one needs in order to ask and answer questions about the quality, quantity and
structure of conversations in a community.  To do so, this paper draws on a unique data source
in doing so: co-authored scientific papers.  The second part of this section describes these data
and the techniques used to analyze them in more detail.  
2.A Case Selection and Comparability
There are three relevant dimensions on which the claim of comparability in this research is
based: (1) the industrial composition and organizational infrastructure of innovation; (2) the
comparability of the cities’ core technologies; and, (3) demographic, geographic and social
comparability of the cities more broadly.  A fourth section describes data gathered from
interviews among relevant actors in the two cities.
• Industrial Composition and the Institutional Infrastructure of
Innovation in 1980
The primary dimension on which the selection was made concerns the concentration and
industrial organization of the local economies.  What stands out immediately about the two
places is the fact that each has historically been home to technology-based mass production
industries in which a troika of major industrial companies took predominate roles.  In Akron,
that industry was tires.  As home to four of the five leading American tire makers, it was known
as the ‘tire capital of the world.’  Rochester was identified with its three major companies,
                                                 
1 On network methods generally, see Wasserman and Faust (1994)
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Kodak, Xerox and Bausch and Lomb, all of which shared a common technology base around
optoelectronics.  In both cities, a broader set of organizations and institutions developed in
relationship to their core industries including cadres of small niche producers, suppliers,
equipment manufacturers, universities, professional associations and unions.
Table 1 contains data showing the relative size and distribution of companies in the two cities
into three categories: major industrial firms, small and medium sized technology-based
companies and finally small and medium sized companies with a low to medium technology
base.  Companies with over $1.5 billion in revenues in 1980 were included in the category of
major industrial firms.  Companies were assigned to the first of the two categories of smaller
firms are based on whether they were included in one of two corporate research and
development directories: the 1986 CorpTek (first available) and Bowker’s Directory of American
Research and Technology for 1982.  Remaining companies were assigned to the last category.
The table shows that both cities had approximately equivalent structures in 1980.  Together,
Akron’ four major tire companies – Goodrich, Goodyear, Firestone and General Tire –
contributed $X billion in revenues to the city’s economy in 1980.2  Rochester’s three major opto-
electronics companies – Eastman Kodak, Xerox and Bausch and Lomb – contributed
approximately $ X billion that same year.3
Both cities, moreover, had a relatively robust group of smaller technology firms which are fairly
comparable in terms of numbers.  However, they differ somewhat with respect to size.  Akron’s
smaller players were relatively larger companies in 1980 than Rochester’s (FILL IN…).   
It proved difficult to gain an accurate representation of the third and last category in Table 1:
smaller, low- to medium-technology companies which in both places in the 1980s.  The data
presented were gathered from a variety of sources including counting the number of companies
that exist today that were founded before 1980, data gathered from a few local industrial
histories of the cities and finally web and lexis-nexus searches which produces a few companies
                                                 
2 A fifth major industrial firm, Babcock and Wilcox, was headquartered within the Akron metropolitan
statistical area as well but was not included because its primary and secondary industries were not directly
related to polymers, but rather to the manufacture of power generation equipment.  However, as will become
apparent later, possibly because it was not related to the other firms with respect to their core technologies
Babcock and Wilcox was an important node in the city’s knowledge network.
3 FINANCIAL DATA ON THESE COMPANIES IN THE 80s IS LAST PIECE OF INFORMATION I
NEED TO GET! THIS SECTION IS THEREFORE SOMEWHAT INCOMPLETE.  NEED TO
CONSULT MOODYS.
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not otherwise found through other means appearing on resumes posted on line and in
obituaries.  These data are therefore incomplete.  However, they at least give an indication of the
magnitude and comparability of low-tech producers.  While the number of such firms is
relatively larger in Akron, both places were clearly home to significant clusters of companies in
these two technologies.
Also, since local universities are a potential determinant of the trajectory of these places, Table 2
presents data comparing the major research universities and polytechnics in the two cities
including data on departments within each that specialize in the technologies with which the
cities are identified.  The data indicate several similarities and differences.  The University of
Rochester is more comprehensive than its counterpart, the University of Akron.  In addition both of
Rochester’s universities are private institutions whereas their counterparts in Akron are public.
Nevertheless, the universities’ capabilities with respect to the core technologies addressed in this
research are quite similar as measured by levels of funding from industry, patenting, rates of scientific
publication and independent national rankings.4  Mitigating the public-private issue is the fact that
both universities have benefited from (and been constrained by) state and federal policymakers
efforts to channel innovation-oriented economic development efforts through university-sponsored
programs—Rochester’s universities are in no way independent from the state’s influence.  At the
same time, the universities’ pertinent industry-related research departments maintained long standing
relationships to local industry that were both philanthropic and intellectual with relatively few
distinctions drawn from the public or private nature of their parent institutions.  Thus, given the
goals of this research, one can safely conclude that the similarities of the two universities outweigh
their differences.
• Comparability of the Regions’ “Core Technologies.”
A second point of comparison concerns the technologies themselves.  On first glance, the
comparison of these two places may seem questionable given the differences in the technologies
involved.  However, on closer inspection, it becomes clear that, while certainly there are
differences between them, the technologies are not as different as one might initially assume.
Table 3 ranks the research intensity of twenty-four major industries in the United States as
                                                 
4 In addition, it should be noted here that I made an explicit decision to exclude organizations with primary
headquarters in the Cleveland metropolitan statistical area from all data pertaining to the comparison of these
two cities.  This decision is motivated out of the desire to keep the comparison as straightforward as possible.
Nevertheless, the choice leaves out several important pieces of that city’s economy.  The important role that
Cleveland based Case Western Reserve University, a private comprehensive research university that perhaps
more on a part the University of Rochester with respect to the breadth of its programs, is one of them.
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indicated by the ratio of research and development spending to revenues.  The data show that
the two categories into which the cities’ industries fall—for Rochester, ‘other computer and
electronic products’ and for Akron, ‘resin, synthetic rubber and fibers’—the industries are about
as well matched as one could hope with 5.9% of revenues spent on R&D in the case opto-
electronics and 5.6% spend in the polymers industry.  Graphs 1.a and 1.b present data on the
number and geographic distribution of patenting activity in the two industry in five year intervals
since the mid-1970s providing further evidence of the technology’s comparability.  At the outset
of this period, significantly more polymers patents were being produced when compared to
optoelectronics.  But by 2000, the two industries were producing approximately the same
number of patents at around 15,000 issues per year (or 75,000 every five years).   
The figures also give an indication of the place the two cities maintain in the global patterns of
knowledge and innovation with respect to these technologies.  Between 1976 and 1980, Akron
inventors accounted for approximately 7% of all polymers patents and, in recently years are
responsible for approximately 5%.  Rochester companies contributed 12% of optoelectronics
patents around 1980 and today account for about 9% globally.  Thus, in both cases, the cities
have lost some ground in the last two decades but nevertheless remain important locales of
innovation.  
• Demographic, geographic and social comparability
Independent of their respective industrial bases, the cities themselves are also quite comparable.
Table 4 presents some basic indicators of the city’s demographic composition.  They show that
Rochester is a slightly larger city at about 1,000,000 residents compared to Akron’s nearly
700,000.  However, when one includes adjacent metropolitan areas, it becomes clear that Akron
is in fact located in close proximity to a larger extended metropolitan area that is home to nearly
4,000,000 residents compared to Rochester’s extended region of around 3,000,000 inhabitants.
As indicated in Figure 1, Akron is located just 40 miles south of Cleveland and is, in fact, fairly
well integrated into a consolidated regional economy encompassing Northeast Ohio in which
Cleveland is the primary city.  Rochester’s closest neighbor is Buffalo which, like Cleveland, has
a fairly large and diversified manufacturing, finance and services based economy.  Significant
linkages between the two Western New York cities exist.  But they are not quite as closely
intertwined as is the case between Akron and Cleveland.  Nevertheless, as the map presented in
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Figure 1 also shows, the cities are situated in similar proximity to many of the major industrial
centers of the northeastern U.S. within the Great Lakes basin.
Finally, Table 5 provides some base line indicators of the cities “innovative capacity” which are
drawn from an assortment of measures that have been advanced by a variety of researchers in
the last several years.  The first two measures show data relating to the concept of “job
sprawl”—the notion that people and employment have moved out central business districts in
recent decades and in to relatively disbursed suburbs (Glaeser and Kahn 2001).  This might
affect innovative capacity to the extent that proximity encourages interactions that might lead to
innovative new ideas and new approaches.  Both cities score in the top quartile of larger
metropolitan areas in the U.S. in this respect with 27% and 33% of jobs located within three
miles of the city’s central business districts in Akron and Rochester respectively; both of which
are above the average for cities in the Northeastern United States.  Furthermore, in Rochester,
nearly 82% of jobs are located within ten miles of the central city which is significantly higher
than other cities.  Thus, in both cities, jobs are concentrated proximally in ways that would at
least not preclude interaction.  
Two indicators of social structure are presented next.  The first shows the percent of local
religious adherents who worship in the Catholic Church.  Some cultural theories of innovation
have attributed a lack of innovativeness within societies to hierarchical cultural structures with
the primary example of such a structure being the highly bureaucratic Roman Catholic Church
(CITE).  In both places, Catholics represent the largest single religious denomination as
indicated by the relatively strong concentrations of Catholic adherents.  The second is a measure
of gay and lesbian households taken from a recent question included in the U.S. Census.  Florida
(2002) and his students have argued that this figure represents a measure of the openness and
tolerance within communities to differences of lifestyle and opinion—traits that they assert are
vital to the innovation process.  The data show that Rochester has a relatively higher population
of gay and lesbian-headed households although both are well within the standard deviation from
the mean which is 0.25.   
Safford – Searching for Silicon Valley DRAFT: Comments Welcome
June 8, 2003
12
2.B Data Collection: Archival and Interviews-Based Data
Having established  the basis on which the cases were selected, this part of the paper describes the
historical and qualitative methods that provide a sense both of the context and of the particular
actions and interventions undertaken in the two places in the last 20 years.
Interviews were conducted among individuals likely to be knowledgeable about how knowledge
networks in the two cities and how it had changed.  Since networks were the “dependent variable”,
so to speak, I conscientiously avoided using industry association lists and university-suggested
contacts as a means of selecting potential interview participants since these sources of information
were likely to lead to only certain parts of the networks.  Interviewees were therefore identified by
compiling a list representing the universe of organizations in the two cities with capabilities in the
cities’ core technologies.  Companies were categorized according to size and “innovative capabilities”
as determined by mentions in relevant directories as well as the number of patents and publications.
Companies were initially identified from a concordance of both Dun and Bradstreet data5 and an
exhaustive search of yellow-pages directories6.  In addition, smaller entrepreneurial companies
identified from databases containing the names and addresses of SBIR award winners7 as well as
from companies that had received venture capital funds.8  Web searches9 and a search of newspaper
articles on lexis-nexus10 were conducted in an effort to find firms going back in time that were
mentioned either in industrial histories, reports or, in a few cases, obituaries.  Historical data on
private research and development laboratories came from various years of the Directory of American
Research and Technology (Jacque Catell Press 1965, 1974, 1983, 1992, 2001) as well as CorpTech
(1985 and 2002).
Among large industrial companies, interviewees included two CEOs, several Vice President for
Research and Development as well as primary liaisons for University-Industry Relations.  Among
smaller companies, interviews were almost always conducted with company presidents or marketing
specialists.  At the universities, interviews included in university Presidents as well as members of
their external relations teams as well as the Dean or a prominent faculty member associated with
relevant research departments.  An effort was also made to identify key informants among “third
party” organizations including labor market intermediaries, one self-described “research
                                                 
5 Available online at www.hoovers.com (subscription required for full access)
6 Available online at www.referenceusa.com (subscription required)
7 Available online at www.zyn.com/sbir/
8 Available online at www.ventureeconomics.com/ (subscription required)
9 Available online at www.goggle.com
10 Available online at www.lexis-nexis.com  (subscription required)
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commercialization catalyst,” the leaders of industry associations and the leaders of important
professional associations.  In total, 45 interviews were conducted (see Appendix A for a list of
interviewees).  Comprehensive notes were taken at each interview and most were recorded and
transcribed.  Interviews typically lasted about one and a half hours.  While all of the interviews were
open-ended (Piore 1979), a consistent theme among interviews involved identifying various kinds of
organizational crises—the loss of major customers, technological discontinuities, changes in supplier
relationships, regulatory changes—to understand how organizations reacted to those crises and how
their reactions affected or were affected by the organizations’ relationships to other organizations
both in inside and outside the district.  In particular, crises that affected similar companies were
probed through further questioning.
Wherever possible, secondary data from newspaper interviews, analysts’ reports, published accounts,
data services and company websites were used to corroborate and extend information gathered in the
interviews.  These were perused to provide an overall impression of the trajectories these companies
have taken in the last thirty years as a check on the generality of trajectory of companies that chosen
for interviews.  To gain a sense of innovative output, data on patenting and scientific publications
were gathered from US Patent Office Data11 and from the Science Citation Index12.
2.C Network Analysis Methods
The similarity of the industries, technologies and histories of these two places combined with the
simultaneity and comparability of the problems they faced in the 1980s provides a unique
opportunity for comparative analysis.  One particularly interesting aspect of what has unfolded in
these communities concerns what happened to the pattern of conversations taking place among
companies.  Network analysis provides a set of techniques for describing and analyzing these
patterns.  In combination with the comparative historical and interview data, these techniques give an
overall sense of how these patterns have evolved and the forces that shaped their evolution.
The data for this analysis were collected on co-authored publications appearing in peer reviewed
scientific journals.  Many companies engaged in science-based industries have found it in their
interest to encourage employees to publish findings in scientific journals.  Indeed, the best and
brightest potential employees actually pay a premium in terms of wages in order to do so (Stern,
1998).  Publications can also result from collaborations across companies whether through informal
                                                 
11 Available online at www.uspto.gov
12 Available online at http://isi2.isiknowledge.com/portal.cgi/wos (subscription required)
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interactions or the result of formal partnerships.  This is likely to be particularly true when
collaborations involve university partners for whom publications are, of course, the coin of the
realm.  Many universities make the potential for such publications a prerequisite for engaging in
collaborations in the first place.
Most conversations among innovators—indeed, probably the vast majority of them—are never
recorded let a lone published.  But, the ones that are published are likely to involve a large portion of
the newest and best ideas.  These ideas, moreover, are ones that emerge through the structured
process of collaborative research and writing; a process that embodies the kinds of collaborative,
creative conversations this paper seeks to observe.  Given the goals of this research, the pattern that
emerges from these collaborations is therefore likely to give fairly accurate indication of just the kinds
of conversations one would be most interested in seeing unfold.
Data were colleted over three year intervals at two points in time: 1980-1982 and 2000-2002.  The
same database on which interviews were selected was used to indicate the universe of innovative
companies in both cities at those two periods of time.  Web of science searches on these companies
were conducted and data on authors’ names and organizational affiliations for each publication on
which at least two names appeared.  A slightly different approach was used to gather data from
universities.  Rather than search for all co-authored publications in the relevant disciplines—which
would have produced an overwhelming number of potentially irrelevant ties—data were collected
only for those faculty and students who showed up as having collaborated with local co-author in
industry.  Individual searches were then conducted on each university-based co-author which
revealed any companies—inside or outside the region—with which they had also co-authored papers.
This procedure, therefore, provides a good indication of what role they may be playing in
“brokering” or “bridging” information.
With this data in hand, authors/organizations [m] were arranged on one axis and publications [n] on
the other creating an [n x m] matrix.  This matrix was then transformed to produce an [m x m]
matrix [MM’] in which each cell represented the number of papers on which a given pair of authors
appeared together on the same paper.   This procedure produced a complete affiliation network.  It is
an affiliation network in the sense that it takes its data from joint participation in a common event,
the assumption of which is that the participants have some kind of a relationship either before or
after the event.  It is complete in the sense that it produces information not only the ties do exist
among individuals in a network, but also one which ties do not exist as well (see Wasserman and Faust
1994)
Safford – Searching for Silicon Valley DRAFT: Comments Welcome
June 8, 2003
15
The data are presented in two different formats.  The first is a graphical representation of ties in the
network.  This network map was produced by submitting the data to Pajek, a software program
designed for large network datasets which contains several different protocols for arranging the
various nodes and arcs of the network in meaningful ways.  The data presented here subjected to a
Fruchterman-Reingold 3d protocol in which the nodes and arcs are arranged in such a way as to
make it possible to see the overall pattern of ties.  The data are arranged mainly to allow for an
analysis of the overall pattern of relationships among all of the nodes taken together and does not
necessarily provide an objective assessment of how “close” they might be or of the “strength” of ties.
The data in these maps are presented on the highest level of aggregation that the data allowed—full
organizations.  Data were collected at the sub-organizational and, of course, individual level as well.
However, presenting those data in graphical form would not have been meaningful with the tools
and space limitations of this particular project.
The second way in which the data are presented is through a block model of ties.  This procedure
categorizes organizations into several buckets or “blocks” and then analyzes the density of ties within
and among these blocks.  This procedure allows one to compare the structure of relationships both
across cities and over time.  The significance of differences among the data contained in the block
models were tested by means of chi-square contingency tables.  However, because most of the ties
for any given organization—and therefore any given block of organizations—are primarily sent and
received within one’s own organization, these data were badly skewed—a violation of the
assumptions of chi-square procedures.  To reduce some of the skew, the data were transformed by
means of taking the natural log.  This however was also problematic since it produced numbers that
were, generally, too small to work according to chi-square assumptions.  The data were therefore
transformed once again by multiplying them by ten.  Two degrees of freedom were taken away as a
result of these transformations.
Having established the ground on which the comparison is to be made and the methods used to
analyze them, the next section provides a brief introduction to the cities and the emergence and
decline of the industries that came to define them in the 20th century as well as the actions
undertaken by organizations in response.
.
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3. The Context: Akron and Rochester in Historical Perspective
The Silicon Valleys of the Second Industrial Revolution had names like Akron, Detroit,
Pittsburgh and Rochester.  In the late 1800s, would-be entrepreneurs from around the world
flocked to these places in order to tap into the excitement—and riches—that came form making
one’s name in emerging technologies and industries.  Successful companies that would go on to
become industrial giants in the 20th century emerged from the cacophony that prevailed in these
cities around the turn of the century.  
Akron was known for much of its history as the “tire capital of the world.”  In 1870, Dr.
Benjamin Franklin Goodrich, a New Yorker who had earned his medical degree in Cleveland a
decade earlier, emigrated there with the intention of establishing the first American rubber
company west of the Appalachian Mountains.  By the turn of the century, Goodrich’s company
had grown into a large establishment supplying rubber tires to the U.S. Army for its new fleet of
airplanes.  At least twenty other small and medium sized rubber-producing companies emerged
in the city over the intervening period as well.  Among them were several firms that would go on
to join Goodrich as internationally prominent industrial companies in the 20th century including
the Goodyear and Firestone Tire and Rubber Companies; each of which grew to prominence as
suppliers of tires to the automobile industry.  
In Rochester, Bausch and Lomb emerged out of the immigrant enclave of skilled German lens
makers as the country’s first mass-producer of eye-glasses, goggles and microscopes.   It was
partially out of this cluster, as well, that Eastman Kodak would eventually emerge on its way to
becoming the world’s leading producer of cameras and photographic film.  Finally, in 1906, the
Haloid Corporation was established as a maker of specialty photographic paper filling a niche
that had been neglected by Kodak.  By the 1960s, Haloid had transformed itself into Xerox, the
world’s leading producer of photocopiers.  
As is briefly sketched below, all of these companies stumbled badly in the 1970 and 1980s as
they started facing stiff foreign competition setting off a series of reactions among different
kinds of actors.  Companies, firstly, began to distance themselves from their place at the very
center of civic, economic, political and economic life in these two cities.  The most wrenching
impact of this distancing was felt in the loss of thousands of jobs among production workers.
Between 1977 and 1982, manufacturing employment declined by over 29% in Akron while
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Rochester lost over 17% of its manufacturing jobs between 1982 and 1987.13  These were among
the over 3.6 million manufacturing jobs lost in the eight states that border North America’s
Great Lakes—a region that collectively became known as the ‘rust belt’ over this decade of time
(Harrison and Bluestone 1982).  
To stem further decline, government and business leaders in these and other mature industrial
cities resolved to partner with companies in order to support their restructuring efforts.  But they
had an ulterior motive in doing so; they hoped to influence these companies in ways that would
ensure they maintained high-end scientific and engineering jobs in place.  Among the policy
interventions that emerged from these efforts, communities encourage research universities to
take on a more significant role in addressing these companies’ needs.  In large part, these efforts
were directed at upgrading the skills of the population in order to meet the skill requirements of
increasingly demanding employers.  But at the same time, it was hoped that universities could
somehow help to reinvigorate companies’ innovation process as well.  Their goal in doing so was
to encourage companies to move toward high technology—high value added—products;
although, in general, states left it up to the universities and their potential industry partners to
define exactly how this arrangement would work in practice.  
This section provides a brief sketch of the events that led to the crisis in the 1980s and of the
ways in which key actors responded.
3.A The Challenge to the Industrial Paradigm in the 1970s and 1980s and the
Responses of Firms: Akron
Over the course of the 20th century, Akron’s tire companies posted tremendous profits by
faithfully producing incremental improvements in tire designs based on what was learned during
the War effort.14  Unfortunately, the tire makers devoted most of their attention to domestic
automakers’ requirements for new car models coming out of Detroit—a part of their business
that accounted for only about 40% of sales.  The remaining 60% of the companies’ tire business
consisted of the retail replacement market sold directly to consumers through a network of retail
establishments.  When the French company Michelin launched a frontal assault on the U.S.
replacement tire market in the 1970s, Akron’s tire companies were caught short.  Investing in
                                                 
13 U.S. Bureau of the Census, City and County Data Books, 1988 and 1994.
14 On Akron’s industrial history, see Love and Giffels (1999); Blackford (1996); Nelson (1988).  This section
draws heavily on Sull (1998; 2001).
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excess of $100 million in five new factories, Michelin introduced its radial tire in 1972 which was
an improvement on Akron’s dominant cross-ply bias tire design providing a longer lifespan and
lower fuel consumption.  
The major American tire producers had ignored the threat and continued to focus on Detroit
(Sull 1998).  Unfortunately, the automakers also stumbled as the OPEC oil crisis abruptly shifted
demand toward smaller cars with less fuel consumption.  Customers began purchasing radial tire
as replacements and Akron’s tire makers suddenly felt the looming threat.  The industry finally
reached a crossroads in 1976 when the United Rubber Workers struck American tire companies,
en masse, for 106 days.  Michelin, Italian producer Pirelli and Britain’s Dunlop were each able to
take advantage of the opening and to make significant inroads into the American tire market.  
Akron’s tire companies responded to these events by moving in three directions simultaneously:
diversification, investment and reorganization.  The companies’ diversification led them to
acquire unrelated companies in industries market steady, stable demand such as utilities,
communications.  The addition of these firms to the tire companies’ portfolios was intended to
create a buffer against market cyclicality which had become a more significant problem as tire
prices came down and the market began to take on properties of a commodity.  At the same
time, however, the companies began to invest more heavily in developing new, fast growing
applications of their existing technologies by extending them into new markets such as
aerospace, building materials as well as faster growing technologies including advanced polymers
and commodity and specialty chemicals.  
All of the companies pursued these two strategies to one degree or another.  Nevertheless, two
different camps emerged with respect to which one was emphasized.  Goodyear and Firestone
made the strategic decision to maintain their identities as tire companies first and aerospace and
chemicals companies second.  With 24% of the American market in tires, Goodyear in particular
had decided to face its foreign competition head on by reinvesting in the innovation process and
also by counterattacking foreign producers in their home markets.  It signaled its approach by
investing $75 million to refurbish a large tire factory in Akron as its new corporate headquarters
and home to its primary corporate R&D labs.  In addition, the company announced that would
spend $125 million to establish a second Technical and Research Center in Luxembourg,
Michelin’s back yard.  
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Goodrich and General Tire took the opposite tack and decided to distance themselves from the
tire business.  Goodrich doubled its investment the production of polyvinyl chloride (PVC), a
plastic resin that was just then gaining popularity as a material in building and construction
supplies.  At the same time, it moved in the direction of transforming itself primarily into a
chemicals company.  General Tire, on the other hand, embarked on a series of acquisitions, the
capstone of which was its purchase of a California-based aerospace company.  
Perhaps not surprisingly, the two camps also differed in their approach to the reorganization of
production.  Goodyear and Firestone invested heavily in new equipment and processes that
would allow them to compete more effectively with foreign competitors.  To do so, they built
new facilities in regions of the country where cheap labor was available rather than investing in
renovating existing factories in the North.  At Goodrich and General Tire, investment in tires
production simply began to lag as they shifted investment to more lucrative areas of their
business.  Both companies eventually sold their tire businesses to foreign competitors who
quickly consolidate their holdings by shutting down virtually all of the companies’ Northern
production facilities.  
Regardless of the particular strategy, the impact on Akron’s large population of rubber workers
was the same.  Between 1975 and 1980, Akron’s tire companies closed 20 cross-ply tire plants
throwing nearly 40,000 workers onto unemployment lines.  Twenty-five thousand of those
works came from Akron.  By 1985—just 15 years after the first Michelin radial tires landed at an
America port—the city of Akron had stopped producing tires intended for passenger
automobiles.  A massive wave of consolidation in the industry ensued.  Goodrich sold its tire
holdings to U.S. Rubber in 1987 in order to focus on its chemical and aerospace businesses.
U.S. Rubber, in turn, sold its own tire business—including the former Goodrich holdings—to
Michelin in 1990.  In 1989, Bridgestone of Japan acquired Firestone and moved its American
headquarters to the Southern state of North Carolina.  General Tire changed its name to
GenCorp in 1984 and sold its tire plants to Continental Tire soon after.  GenCorp remained
headquartered in Akron and moved heavily into polymers, auto-parts manufacturing, chemicals,
communication, energy and aerospace.  In 1998, the company spun-off its polymers related-
operations (which remained in Akron) and moved its headquarters to California.  Thus, by the
mid-1990s, Goodyear was the only major tire company still headquartered in Akron.  
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3.B The Challenge to the Industrial Paradigm in the 1970s and 1980s and the
Responses of Firms: Rochester
In 1965, Kodak’s share of the world consumer film market was in excess of 90%, Xerox sold
75% of the world’s copiers and Bausch and Lomb produced 40% of the world’s eyeglasses.
These stratospheric market shares, however, were challenged beginning in the 1970s and then
dramatically so in the 1980s.  The first challenge to Kodak came from a domestic
competitor—the Polaroid Corporation’s instant camera first produced in 19XX.  Soon, however,
the company faced a more significant threat from Japan’s Fuji Film Company.  Unlike the threat
that faced the tire companies from Michelin’s radial tire, Fuji’s innovation was not
technological—its advantage was cost.  Having established a strong distribution network in the
United States, it began chipping away at Kodak’s dominance abroad and eventually in domestic
markets as well.  Xerox also came under competitive pressure including major threats when, in
the 1980s, both Kodak and IBM both started to produce a high-end copier system for use in
large office setting.  A more significant threat emerged from the Japanese company Cannon,
which made headway into the more profitable lower end of the copier market.15   
Like Akron’s tire companies, Rochester’s large industrial companies sought to buffer against
these shocks by diversify their holdings.  And, like Akron, the different companies did so in very
different ways.  Kodak distributed resources among what were seen as a more stable set of
industries including chemicals and pharmaceuticals.  At the same time, the company attempted
to move its research efforts into fast growth areas both by concentrating on creating advances in
their core products—cameras and film—and by moving aggressively into new areas such as
LCD displays and semi-conductors.  In doing so, however, they never considered abandoning
their core identity as maker of film and related equipment.  Xerox, on the other hand, was more
ambitious.  Though it faced some competition – both from its homegrown neighbors Kodak
and IBM which both produced high-end copiers and from the Japanese company Cannon at the
low end – it enjoyed steady strong demand for its copiers.  It sought to build on this steady
income stream by diversifying into more lucrative technological areas.  In the 1970s Xerox
bought printer, plotter, and disk drive businesses, as well as record carrier Western Union.  It
also embarked on a plan to into the computer business and signaled its commitment by building
                                                 
15 See generally, McKelvey (1993); Buttino (1984); Swasy (1997); Collins (1990); Howe (2002); Hitzik (1999);
Kearns and Nadler (1992)
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a major new research arm in Palo Alto, California.16  In the early 1980s, the company moved its
headquarters to Connecticut.  It nevertheless kept production, headquarters and R&D of its
office products division—which included copiers—located in Rochester.  
3.C Companies’ Efforts to Shift to Science-Oriented Economic Base: Akron and
Rochester in the 1980s
As touched on above, one of the three pillars on which industrial companies based their
strategies in the 1970s was to diversify resources by investing in potential high-growth areas
associated with their core technologies.  In Akron, that technology was polymers chemistry
which is the science of long molecules that give rise to materials ranging from basic the plastic
resins that make food wrapping to more sophisticated materials such a crystals (which, for
instance, make flat screen displays possible) and the advanced materials necessary for extreme
conditions such as space flight.  Rubber is a naturally occurring polymer.  But, to make it useful
for most commercial applications requires a surprising amount of sophisticated processing.
With the onset of the Second World War the Japanese gained a stranglehold on the supply of
natural rubber which was located on vast plantations—owned and operated by American tire
makers—in the South Pacific.  Companies in the United States were forced to accelerate the
search for a synthetic replacement leading to an expansion in the technological capabilities of the
companies.  Already tied into the flow of raw materials, this proved to be a catalyst toward the
development of sophisticated polymers capabilities among the tire companies which would
prove to the basis on which the city’s economic future has come to rely.
All of Akron’s tire companies had built significant commodity plastics businesses by the 1970s
with BF Goodrich and Firestone becoming increasingly dependent on these divisions as sources
of revenue.  The tire companies joined the ranks of several other nearby firms that were
significant commodity producers of plastic resins including Ferro Corporation, headquartered
twenty miles north in Cleveland as well as several smaller local custom resin compounding
companies including M.A. Hanna and A. Schulman.  
                                                 
16 Xerox’s Palo Alto laboratories became a prodigious contributor of many important innovations including the
laser printer, the computer mouse and the Ethernet.  However, none of these innovations were ultimately
commercialized by Xerox.
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Figure 2.a shows the structure of the polymers industry and the place Akron has assumed within
it.  The supply chain in polymers begins with the producers of raw materials, a multi-billion
dollar segment of the chain dominated by large petroleum and chemicals companies such as
ExxonMobil, Monsanto and DuPont.  Materials are then channeled to compounders which mix
the materials in various combinations to produce specific resins.  Some of these materials—like
PVC and polyurethane—are standard and produced in very large batches which are then sold for
processing by producers ranging from small scale plastics injection molders to large industrial
users such as automotive and appliance makers.   
In Rochester, the shift toward optical electronics followed a similar pattern.  Figure 2.b shows
the structure of the optical-electronics supply chain.  The emergence of the three large industrial
companies in Rochester was preceded by the establishment of a small cluster of optical lens
makers in the nineteenth century.  Initially intended mainly for eyeglasses, the city’s large
consumer-oriented industrial companies would eventually provide a market for more
sophisticated optical components.  As the large companies diversified into computer technology,
instrumentation and satellite applications in the 1970s, they demanded even more sophistication.
The troubles the large companies faced in the 1980s led to disruptions for local suppliers.  These
companies were forced to look outside the region for customers and opportunities as a result.
3.D University-Industry Partnerships
The competitive challenge and the dramatic declines in production employment that followed
sparked crises in both cities.  As the large companies shifted resources to faster growing
industries—which were increasingly being located in places other than Akron and
Rochester—civic, government, and business leaders grew fearful that their cities would follow
the same “hollowing out” path their “rust-belt” neighbors had begun to experience.  They called
on the local universities—particularly the major research universities located in the cities—to
take a more active role in supporting companies’ innovation efforts.  
In fulfilling this mandate, however, the universities in the two cities took significantly different
approaches.  As this section explains, in Akron, the approach most closely resembles Burt’s
(1992) notion of bridging structural holes, in this case, between the research taking place inside
university labs and the research and development laboratories of companies.  In Rochester, the
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approach can be characterized as coming closer to building ‘institutional thickness’ (Amin and
Thrift 1994) and ‘social capital’ (Portes 1992).
• The University of Akron
The history of the University of Akron’s interactions with the polymers industry stretch back to
the 1930s when Professor Frank Knight began holding an evening class at which scientists and
engineers from the city’s rubber companies would gather for seminars.17  The Second World
War brought a more formal arrangement as the University became a significant node in the U.S.
federal government’s effort to build a domestic synthetic rubber industry as a substitute for the
natural rubber supplies which had been cut off by Japanese expansion into the South Pacific.
That history laid the groundwork for a transition to the development of a top-notch research
department in materials science.  In the 1950s, researchers at the University started to work with
cutting edge technologies associated with long molecule polymers.  By the 1970s, the University
was rated among the top four Ph.D. programs in polymers science along with MIT, the
University of Massachusetts, Amherst and Case Western Reserve in nearby Cleveland.
From the University’s perspective, however, these calls were not immediately seen in a positive
light.  As one prominent informant put it, the university got “dragged kicking and screaming into
economic development.”  University leaders eventually assessed their capabilities and their values
as an institution and decided that it was in a position to do two things to assist the community’s
economic development efforts.  The first, was to continue doing what it had already been doing
for decades: turning out highly qualified scientists and engineers.  Many of those workers
remained in the region to start families and, in doing so, became a significant locally embedded
resource to support companies’ efforts.  The second, was to add a set of capabilities that could
help address the problem solving needs of local industry.
• The Edison Polymers Innovation Corporation
In 1983, a consortium of university and corporate leaders approached the State of Ohio to apply
for a grant under the state’s Thomas Edison technology partnership program.  Like several other
industrial states in the Northeast, the State of Ohio hoped to encourage innovation by making
                                                 
17 For a history of the University of Akron, see Auburn (1970).  For a history of the University’s polymer
department see Morton (1989; 1976).  On the University’s economic development initiatives, see Worthy
(1990) and Kelley (1984).
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public funds more readily available for research and development.  To receive the funds,
however, project proposals were required to be submitted by a coalition of actors with a home at
a research university.  The focus of the Edison Polymers Innovation Center was on
polymers—an industry that had little identity as an industry, despite the large concentration of
companies in the region that drew on polymers as a major source of their revenues.  Most
polymers companies had begun as parts of companies—such as the tire makers—and were
therefore mainly associated with the projects those companies ultimately produced such as
vacuum cleaners and the automobile industry.  The University and EPIC were immediately were
confronted with the issue of having to establish an identity among companies in the industry.  
The initial model required companies to make a significant investment—up to $50 million—in
the program.  In return, they were afforded a “window on technology” and first rights to
intellectual property that was coming out of the university’s labs.  
• The University of Rochester
As in Akron, fears of significant restructuring from its largest and most prominent companies
led the city’s business, civic and political leaders to search for ways of building a more
robust—and more innovative—economic base within the region.  The city’s two major
universities—the University of Rochester and the Rochester Institute of Technology—were
called on to play more active roles in transforming existing capabilities in ways that would to
retain knowledge and facilitate learning among local firms. Several university-based initiatives
were key: the Laboratory for Laser Energetics and the New York State Center for Advanced
Technology in Electronic Imaging Systems (CAT-EIS).
• Center for Optical Manufacturing
In 1989, the head of the University of Rochester’s Institute of Optics and representatives of
Eastman Kodak joined forces to lobby for U.S. Army funds in order to set up a Center for
Optics Manufacturing housed at the University’s Laboratory for Laser Energetics.  The goal was
to learn how to process glass using computer control.  Until this point, skilled craftsmen—many
of whom could be found among the scattered optical shops in the Rochester area—made all but
the simplest optical lenses by hand.  By the late 1980s, however, many of those capabilities had
moved off shore.   
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Kodak loaned a prominent researcher, Henry Pellicove, to the project.  Pellicove had previously
worked on one of the company’s major innovative initiatives, the disc camera.  While the disc
camera ultimately turned out not to be a significant commercial success, it had required a
number of technical advances including the mass production of an asphyrical lens which made
the camera’s thin profile possible.  Manufacturing the lens with existing technology turned out to
be problematic.  The Optical Manufacturing Center set out to build a consortium of companies
interested in developing computer aided optical manufacturing technologies.  Twenty companies
became involved in the effort.  
• Center for Advanced Technology in Electronic Imaging Systems
The second university-based initiative, CAT-EIS, was initially intended to provide large
companies with seed capital and access to resources in support of imaging technologies.  When it
was created in 1989, the program was designed to channel funds from the State of New York to
major companies in order to support innovation and basic research.  Later in the decade,
however, the program shifted its emphasis toward developing entrepreneurial businesses and
providing assistance to small businesses.  Its primary function remains transferring funds
although today those funds are more directly accountable to the goal of creating jobs.   
4. The Evolution of Intellectual Networks in Akron and Rochester
Three important facts emerge that from the preceding discussion of what has happened in
Akron and Rochester in the last twenty years.  First, in both places, clusters of industry emerged
around core technology at the end of the 19th century which grew and prospered in the 20th
century.  In both cases, a troika of major international firms emerged around these technologies.
Second, by the 1980s, these companies had run into competitiveness issues related which
stemmed, in part, to their apparent inability to innovate.  Companies in both places took actions
designed to address this concern including acquiring portfolio companies, building new research
capabilities in different areas of technology and moving some innovation activities to places
thought to be more cutting edge.  Finally, community leaders in both places engaged in very
similar interventions designed to use local universities as a base from which to engage companies
in an effort to improve innovative capabilities in place.  This section seeks to understand what
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happened to the structure and pattern of knowledge networks in the two cities once these forces
were set in motion.
Importantly, the universities developed different perspectives on how to proceed; perspectives
that coincide, quite neatly in fact, with the two theories of university involvement.    Akron’s
“windows on technology” approach resembles Burt’s (1992) notion of bridging structural holes.
By brokering its position between the cutting edge research coming out of its labs and,
potentially, translating what was coming out elsewhere, the university hoped to parley its unique
structural (and repuational) position within the city to propel both it and the city’s economic
fortunes forward.  The University of Rochester’s approach, on the other hand, more closely
resembles the notions of Amin and Thrift (1992; 1994) concerning building institutional capacity
within the community toward developing greater stocks of “social capital” or relational density
within it.   
As described in the methods section (section 2), the data for this analysis are drawn from co-
authored scientific papers published by individuals in local companies and their collaborators.
The data were collected over three year intervals at two points in time: 1980-1982 and 2000-
2002.  In this section, we will first consider the similarities and differences between the two cities
in the early 1980s.  Doing so both contributes one more dimension on which to base the
comparison of the two cities while, at the same time, providing the base line on which to
evaluate the degree and nature of the changes that have taken place.  The second part of this
section presents data on what the networks look like today and draws some conclusions about
the degree and nature of the changes that have taken place.  The third part, finally, discusses how
the two networks have evolved through block modeling techniques which allow one to make
direct comparisons both within and among the networks over time.
4.A Knowledge Networks: Akron and Rochester: 1980-1982
Table 6 presents basic descriptive statistics on the four networks that emerged from the data
indicating their relative sizes, densities and centralization scores.  The number of organizations
represents the size of the M x M matrix which is created by matching co-authors (and their
home organizations) to each other.  Focusing on data from the early 1980s, the data indicate that
Rochester’s network was slightly larger than Akron’s at 104 and 85 organizations, respectively.
The measure in the next row indicates the total number of publications found in each interval of
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time.  Akron has a larger number of publications in the early 1980s, though only slightly so at
236 compared to Rochester’s 198.  On average, each of those publications in Akron had 2.8
authors compared to nearly 4 in Rochester.18  In total, the number of author-publication pairs
was 661 in Akron compared to 764 in Rochester.  Several authors appear on more than one
publication.  The number of “unique” authors, that is, the number of authors when one counts
an author only once in each data set, is almost exactly the same between the two cities in the
early 1980s at 463 in Akron and 465 in Rochester.  
Of course, these numbers provide little indication of differentiation within the network among
actors that may be more or less important.  In fact, a few organizations produce the majority of
publications in the network as indicated by comparing the mean number of authors per
organization in the network as a whole to the figure one gets when one weights this figure by
organization.  In Akron, the mean number of authors per organization is 22.59 compared to the
overall network figure of 7.8.  The spread in Rochester is almost exactly the same at 22.67 versus
7.3.  However, the overall skew of the network is revealed by analyzing the standard deviations
on the mean number of authors per organization.  Although Akron and Rochester are relatively
similar in terms of value, the standard deviation in Rochester is much greater.  
The information contained in Table 7 gives some indication of the degree to which particular
organizations are responsible for this skew.  The data show that in Akron, for instance, the
network’s most prolific organization the 1980s was B.F. Goodrich with 180 authors, followed by
the University of Akron with 64.  In Rochester, Xerox was the most prolific at 183 with the
University of Rochester coming in second at 172.  
At this point, what these data indicate is that the networks of these two places were fairly similar
in the early 1980s in terms of size and the composition of its actors.  This similarity is confirmed
in the graphical representations of the two networks presented in Figures 3.a and 3.b.  The
placement of nodes on these “maps” is neither geographic nor based on the “strength” or
“weakness” of ties.  Rather, the map is simply meant to show the overall pattern of relationships
throughout the network as a whole; it shows the paths through which information must flow to
get from one point to another.  The overall sizes of the networks are similar as are the number
of nodes that seem to be significant contributors.  However, what also jumps out is the apparent
                                                 
18 Keeping in mind that sole authored papers were excluded from the dataset.
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differences in the density of the two networks.  In Rochester, companies seem somewhat more
connected to each other through multiple paths (though it is interesting to note from this data
that there are no direct ties between Rochester’s two major companies, Kodak and Xerox).  In
Akron, on the other hand, the network is more linear with the major axis of information passing
from the university on one end to B.F. Goodrich on the other passing through Goodyear and
Babcock and Wilcox (with a major ‘spur’ branching off to Firestone) in between.  
The data in Table 8 provide further indication of the structures of the two networks.  Mean
distances between actors are fairly similar between the two cities at 1.7 ties (or, “degrees of
separation”) and 1.8 in Akron and Rochester respectively.  The standard deviations, however,
provide some indication of the differences with Akron organizations falling into a narrower
range of ties than compared to Rochester.  This is confirmed by the maximum distances
between the two networks.  The longest possible path in Akron was 6 in Akron and 10 in
Rochester.
The University of Akron’s position on one end of this network is interesting when compared to
the place of the University of Rochester; it is positioned in between the two major corporate
actors.  The concept of ‘centrality’ provides a way of describing this difference objectively.  The
second measure presented in Table 7 is an index of centrality derived from summing the number
of shortest paths through passing through a given actor in the network.  A path is defined as the
string of ties connecting one actor in the network to another.  The shortest path is the one that
passes through the fewest number of nodes from one end to the other.  Summing the number of
shortest paths that runs through a given actor provides a measure of the centrality of that actor
within the network.  One interesting fact to note is that the largest actor (in terms of authorships
in this case) is not necessarily the most central.  In Akron, the central actor in the early 1980s
was actually a surprise; Babcock and Wilcox is a locally based company that produces power
generators and is therefore not directly related to local industry.  And yet, it was among the
organizations most collaborated with among the region’s core rubber and plastics companies at
that time.  In Rochester, the most central actor is Eastman Kodak which came in third in that
year in terms of the number of authors.  
The overall impression to take away from these data is that, while the networks were of fairly
similar in size and contained actors who were fairly similar along a number of important
Safford – Searching for Silicon Valley DRAFT: Comments Welcome
June 8, 2003
29
dimensions, one can see that the networks were at least somewhat different in terms of their
structures with Akron being less densely interconnected.
4.B Knowledge Networks: Akron and Rochester: 2000-2002
Having established the similarity of these two networks we can now turn to how the structure of
the networks looks today.  Returning to Table 6, the first thing that becomes apparent is the
relative sizes of the networks has changed.  Akron’s has grown but only a little from 85
organizations in the 1980s to 100 today.  In Rochester, the number of organizations in the
network doubled to 516.  In terms of the number of publications, the differences are even more
striking with only 166 publications and 377 unique authors in Akron – a decline from the 1980s
– compared to 516 papers and 795 unique authors in Rochester.  In general, the number of
authors per organization stayed about the same in Akron at 22.59 (though the standard deviation
on this measure increased significantly) compared to Rochester where it doubled.  Publications,
clearly, became a more important medium of “conversing” in Rochester over these twenty years.
Looking at how particular actors’ publishing trajectories changed provides some indication of
what is going on.  In Rochester, Eastman Kodak shot to the top among the network’s producers
of scientific publications with 543.  This was followed relatively closely by the University of
Rochester which has 438 publications in the network.  In Akron, the top producers of papers are
the region’s two prominent universities: the University of Akron and nearby Case Western
Reserve located in Cleveland (again, here it is interesting to note that these two universities have
no actual joint publications between them—at least not among faculty who are collaborating
with local industry).  
The data are helpful in that they give us a sense of magnitude.  But the differences between
Akron and Rochester today come alive in the graphical representations, presented in Figures 3.c
and 3.d.  Despite the radical industrial restructuring that has taken place over the intervening 20
years, Akron’s network looks little changed from how it looked from the early 1980s.  While
there is more density in terms of interconnections among prominent actors, they network
remains relatively sparse and disjointed.  Rochester, on the other hand, seems to have exploded
with conversations scattered throughout.  The range of actors and the complexity of inter-
relationships have grown in Rochester whereas, in Akron, the conversations have remained
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disciplined and well ordered.  If these were networks represented graduate student parties,
there’s no question which one seems likely to be the livelier and more interesting of the two.  
4.C Evolution of the Networks: 1980-2002
These data provide a good sense of how networks have evolved in the two cities over time.
While they started off relatively similar, Rochester’s network has undergone what seems to be a
radical transformation both in terms of size and composition.  However, the data so far do not
give a good sense of exactly how they have changed except in the broadest possible terms.  Nor
do they give us a detailed understanding of what roles actors play within the network or what the
particular patterns mean.  This section presents the data in an alternative form which allows us
to make more detailed comparisons and to draw some conclusions about how the differences in
the networks might relate to specific outcomes.
The data in this section are presented in the form of block models (Tables 9 a-d) which
aggregate the data into several categories.  Three categories of companies were identified, as
described in the methods section above: multinational firms, small and medium sized technology
companies and universities.  The data were furthermore divided into three geographical
categories: local (defined as firms located in the cities’ respective metropolitan statistical areas),
national (which includes all multinationals regardless of where their headquarters are located)
and international.  The block models therefore reduce each of the four M x M, organization-
based matrices to 8 x 8 categorical matrices.  For our purposes, however, only the connections
emanating from within the local region are meaningful, therefore, the matrices are presented as 3
x 8 tables showing the percent of ties sent from each of the three local categories of actors to
others in the network.  Each cell shows the percent of ties sent from the category on the left to
the category on the top, totaling 100% across each row.  The total number of ties for each row is
presented in the second to last column.   
Finally, to get a sense of the significance of differences both over time and between the two
networks in the 1980 (T0, so to speak) the data were subjected to Chi-square tests in which each
row of the model was tested against the corresponding rows in the other tables.   These were
treated as contingency tables, thus significance indicates a result that is significantly different
from what one would otherwise expect given all of the other values in the row weighted by the
total number of ties in that category, city and year.  
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• 1980-1982
The first thing that jumps out of the Table 9a, which shows Akron’s ties in the early 1980s, is the
degree to which the city’s multinationals were speaking almost exclusively with each other at that
point in history.  From the network map in Figure 3a, it is clear that they are not actually
speaking to each other, but rather each company is mainly speaking to itself.  This provides
concrete evidence of the pattern described by Don Sull and colleagues have written on (Sull
1998; 2001): Akron’s tire companies though direct competitors, spoke mainly into an echo
chamber which might help explain the subsequent upheaval in the industry.  But the data
indicate that they were not alone in this; 78% of the University’s ties were to itself with the next
major category being other universities outside the area.  Worse still were Akron’s small to
medium sized technology firms where 95% of ties were internally directed.  Tellingly, there were
no ties between smaller tech firms and city’s universities at this time and extremely few ties
between the multi-nationals and local universities (9.5% of large companies’ ties were to
universities outside the region compared to just 0.4% of ties locally) or to local technology
companies.  In short, Akron’s local network in the 1980s was remarkably insular and yet, at the
same time, remarkably disconnected.  
Rochester’s networks at the time were slightly better, but not by much.  Sixty-six percent (66%)
of multinational’s ties were internally directed in 1980 while the figure for the universities is
essentially identical to that of Akron with 77% of its authors finding co-authors locally.  One
significant difference between the two places, however, is in the ties between local tech
companies and other organizations.  Local technology firms directed 8.5% of their ties to the
local multinationals.  But, in a very similar pattern to Akron, none of their co-authored papers
were sent to local universities at the time although 21% were directed toward universities outside
the region.  
• 2000-2002
Jumping forward in time, one can see important changes in the structure of the networks.  The
Akron of 2002 resembles the network that existed in Rochester in 1982.  The major companies
are far less insular than they once were.  However, those ties have not necessarily been re-
distributed locally.  Rather, for the most part, they are spread out among all of the categories of
companies outside the region including a significant increase in collaborations among non-US
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based technology firms.  There are no ties between large local companies and smaller ones,
although ties to local universities have increased somewhat (however, the difference is not
statistically significantly).  
As one might expect, the data tell as different story in Rochester.  It is interesting to note
comparing across time in the two cities that the total percent of local ties (indicated in the first
Group Total cell in each table) decreased in Akron over this period from 86 to 74%.  It went in
precisely the opposite direction in Rochester increasing from 74 to 81%.  In doing so, however,
what is striking is that almost all of the local increase is due to increased collaborations among
local organizations including significant increases in between local multinationals and
universities, among local tech firms and between tech firms and local universities.  
5. Explaining the Divergent Trajectories
The story that emerges from the network data is one of divergence.  In Akron, despite the
decline of the tires industry gave way to a group of smaller, more focused companies with a
higher technology-base.  In doing so, the region retained this very important set of local actors
and certainly has been successful in parlaying its inherited stock of capability to build a new
industry “on the ashes” so to speak of the old.  However, what seems not to have been
overcome entirely is the inability of local companies to talk effectively; firms within the city
remain largely walled off from each other.   In Rochester, the major companies remained more
or less intact over time.  They did nevertheless, reach out in order to tap into conversations
taking place elsewhere (Xerox and its Palo Alto Research Center is only one example).  But
clearly something happened along the way; something has allowed companies in Rochester to
engage each other in significant ways.  This section of the paper explores both the how and the “so
what”.  The first part of the section discusses the role of the universities emerges as an important
factor in explaining the divergence.   The second part asks what impact these differences have
had on one important aspect of the city’s innovation system: entrepreneurship.
5.A The Role of the Universities in Affecting Change
Rochester emerges from these cases as exceptional with its proliferation of local ties and the
surprising increase in the local nature of conversations taking place within it.  In the early 1980s,
ties between the city’s large industrial firms, universities and tech companies were relatively
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disjointed.  Today, however, the university has emerged as probably the most critical player
having increased its connections among both local companies both large and small.  Looking
more closely at the actual pattern that has emerged in Rochester in combination with the
targeted interviews that were conducted as part of this research provides an indication of what
explains this difference.  
The key element of Rochester’s relative success was the willingness of companies to engage the
university—and subsequently, local firms—around substantive, creative and intellectual ideas.  The
university’s approach – particularly its emphasized facilitating interactions among firms – was an
important factor in making this possible.  Through the creation of consortia and the encouragement
of joint work between university and industry researchers, the university built relationships among
local actors that generated a higher level of trust.  This trust, in turn, led companies to interact with
local organizations not just as suppliers—as had been the case in earlier eras—but around ideas as
well.  Akron’s approach, which centered on generating new ideas and knowledgeable people with the
goal of injecting these into the local economy, failed to achieve its intended result.  Industry, it turned
out, already had ideas and the university was already doing a good job of producing highly capable
engineers and scientists.  What they lacked was the forum for interaction among companies which
the university—as was the case in Rochester—were uniquely situated to provide.
• The University of Akron’s “Window on Technology Approach”
What became apparent in Akron was that many of these companies already had very
sophisticated—indeed, world class—research and development operations of their own and
these labs were dedicated to the search for utilizable discoveries, not the long-range forward
thinking projects that were coming out of the universities.  With time, it became clear that very
little output commercial value had emerged from collaboration with the University.  So, from the
industry’s perspective, the model failed.  There were experts at the University in specific fields
and companies used their labs for very specialized tests.  But companies weren’t able—or
interested—in taking advantage of their inventions.  Indeed, many of the largest companies had
begun crafting very sophisticated strategies for interacting with universities that involved
developing targeted research collaborations wherever the best research was taking place, not just
with the local departments.  As one company official put it, “our interest is more or less
community influenced.  Staying involved locally will have spin-off effects.  The quality of the
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education and the students available will improve.  Because of the climate, I would like to get an
innovative climate that would increase our talent base.”   
However, around this time, the economics of the polymers industry began to shift.  As the large
industrial tire companies spun off their commodities plastic businesses, those businesses
suddenly found themselves without the financial cushion that a large conglomerate or industrial
firm could provide.  Tied to cyclical commodities prices, the new polymers companies sought
out more stable, and more profitably, income streams.   
The thinking adopted by virtually all of the large-scale commodity plastics companies in Akron
was that, to be successful, they needed to bring in more technology and more people and
become very agile.  They did this either by pursuing relationships—and eventually
acquisitions—of specialized, custom and engineered compounding services firms that allowed
companies to invest in developing specialized polymer resins that met particular customer needs.
In the 1990s, this custom segment of the industry grew and many of the commodities plastics
producers made the decision to pursue mergers with the custom compounders as a way of
building a more stable income stream.
• Ohio Polymer Enterprise Corporation
By 1995, no one was happy with EPIC.  Large plastic resin compounders saw little value in the
university relationships.  Small producers felt their interests were inadequately addressed.  The
University felt pulled in too many directions.  The decision was made to put the program on
stasis until a new model emerged to make it work.  The arrival of a new University President,
Luis Proezna, marked the beginning of a second round of thinking how to better utilize the
resources of the university in the service of building innovative capacity into the region’s
polymers industry.  Unlike the EPIC model’s emphasis on technology transfer, the new
scheme—coordinated through a new organization known as the Ohio Polymer Enterprise
Development Corporation or OPED—emerged based on the logic of bridging among
disconnected parts of the community.  It is too soon to tell whether these efforts will be
successful.  But it is interesting, and reassuring, to note that the general approach being taken by
the university today resembles, in several ways, the more facilitative, conversation driven,
approach that has emerged in Rochester.
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• The University of Rochester’s Approach
The University of Rochester took a different approach.  The first of Rochester’s two major
university-industry partnerships was the Laboratory for Laser Energetics which set out, initially,
to form collaborations among local firms which sought to develop long range technologies in
the field of lasers.  Housed in an academic department with significant funding from the U.S.
Government, the project was committed to openly publishing findings and, broadly, to engaging
companies in forward looking conversations.  They succeeded in producing a technology that
could build aspherical senses using computer-controlled machines.  However, German and
Japanese companies picked up the technology quickly after publication.  As one member of the
team put it “our job was to introduce the technology to the U.S. first.  If they didn’t jump, it’s
not our fault.  We move on.”   In 1992, an entrepreneur from New York City traveled to Belarus
and met with a group of scientists at the Lukiv institute.  They had been working on large “Star
Wars” like lasers—designed to compete with the U.S.’s Reagan era initiative to blast incoming
nuclear warheads out of the sky with satellite mounted laser systems—when the UUSR fell.
However, as part of the effort, the scientists had found a fluid technology that could polish
glass—including asphyrical lenses.
Scientists from the University of Rochester then visited team leader William Kordonski in the
Byelorussian capital of Minsk.  They were impressed and when they retuned to Rochester, they
set about to bring the technology back to the United States and, this time, to ensure that the
technology would be taken advantage of by a U.S.—and Rochester based—company.  To do so,
they set up a research collaboration involving several high-tech companies in the Rochester area.
They also brought Kordonski's team to the U.S.  The result was three patents and the
introduction of a commercializable polishing technology—magnetorheological finishing (MRF)
which magnetically manipulates the viscosity of fluid while it is in contact with a portion of the
glass. That creates "a subaperture polishing lap" that conforms to the optical surface. The
technology has three primary advantages: the MRF "polishing tool" never dulls; because it is a
compliant fluid, it adapts to complex shapes; and removal rates are very high, resulting in short
processing times.   
The second of these—its ability to adapt to complex shapes—is particularly important.  Working
with the U.S. Department of Defense's Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and
researchers from the University, a consortium of companies has developed a system to automate
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the manufacture of unusually shaped lenses known as aspheres—the first one of its kind.
Typically, it costs up to $4,000 aspherical lenses which limits their commercial use.  Nevertheless,
aspherical lenses have the ability to deliver much better optical performance and image quality
than traditional spherical ones since an aspherical lens or mirror focuses incoming rays to a
single point, while spherical lenses can cause blurring. The machine will push costs down to as
little as $25 to $100 per lens.
Byelocorp and the University of Rochester’s Center for Optics Manufacturing jointly licensed
the technology to QED Technologies, a company founded late in 1996 with several University
of Rochester faculty and Kordonski on the payroll, to develop enabling technologies for
precision finishing. The company has assembled a consortium consisting of the University,
Moore Incorporated, Byelocorp Scientific, Raytheon TI Systems, Eastman Kodak, Opkor,
Lockheed Martin, and OptiPro Systems, and funded partly by DARPA to make the MRF
systems.
The second of Rochester’s partnership efforts, the CAT-EIS initiative, focused building ties
between companies and university faculty.  Initially, at least, this was meant to provide
companies with a source what substantially amounted to subsidized consulting provided by
university professors and graduate students.  With time, though, the priorities of the state
sponsors have shifted toward promoting entrepreneurship.  As a result, over time, the university
has made an effort to develop ties to smaller firms.  In doing so, however, the university
certainly has not lost its ties to the large companies.  Nevertheless they have been able to parley
their relationships on both sides into concrete outcomes.  
An example of the how this has happened is Pixel Physics.  Pixel Physics, was founded by
researchers from RIT, designs and markets imaging systems for remote sensing and precision
applications.  The company maintains a test and evaluation laboratory that serves both their own
internal development as well as offering testing services on a contract basis.  The company
targets the areas of aerial imaging, biomedical optics, and precision metrology markets with
application-specific systems based on their own internally developed technology.
Pixel Physics employs engineers and scientists who are experienced in building complex
embedded systems using a variety of host architectures and real-time operating systems.  Pixel
Physics corporate strategy is designed to cultivate scientific advisors and university faculty
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affiliates with long-standing business and academic relationships in the Rochester area. They
draw on the region’s talent pool to gain insight and develop solutions to address clients' needs.
In partnership with another local firm—Sine Patterns—Pixel Physics has developed a suite of
test target standards that go beyond ISO requirements.  The companies have developed test
protocols to measure noise, non-uniformity, yield and sensitivity parameters associated with the
introduction of a new image sensor technology—Complementary Metal Oxide
Semiconductor—developed by Kodak.
Pixel Physics recently announced their first product, an integrated imaging system that has been
designed for airborne imaging.  Employing a technology developed—but not
commercialized—at Kodak the company’s new product TerraPix has a 16 million pixel sensor
that provides greatly increased area coverage without compromising resolution.  In combination
with software under development in cooperation with RIT, the technology can be used, for
instance, in analyzing and modeling wildfires.  
5.B Knowledge Networks and Entrepreneurship
These anecdotes suggest that one of the ways in which shifts in the structure of networks has
concrete impacts on the ground is on entrepreneurship.  The data bear this out.  Table 10 shows
several indicators of entrepreneurial activity in the two cities since the 1980s.  Rochester’s
optoelectronics companies have won significantly greater numbers of SBIR19 awards than Akron
polymers-related companies.  At the same time, they have garnered a significantly greater share
of the pool of venture-oriented venture capital funds.  These numbers are true both in absolute
terms and in terms of the percentage of awards and funds granted in those technologies overall.
These differences are the result of the different strategies companies in the regions took in
restructuring their innovation processes in the 1990s.  Large commodities polymer companies
spinning-off in the 1990s were determined to acquire customization capabilities.  However,
rather than develop relationships with small, entrepreneurial companies as the means of
achieving these capabilities—a path that their counterparts in the pharmaceutical industry have
taken—the companies instead integrate those capabilities—primarily though acquisitions.  In
Rochester, the large industrial companies started to reconsolidate their research capabilities into
                                                 
19 The SBIR award program is a federal government program that awards seed grants to entrepreneurial
companies based on a rigorous—peer reviewed—selection process.  See Audretsch (2003) for a description.
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the region in the 1990s.  By the end of the decade, they had also started to warm to the notion of
outsourcing a more significant portion of their research and development activities.   
Differences in the rate of new company startups in the two cities can be attributed to the
different ways in which the universities interacted with industry.  In Akron, despite the
technology boom, very few high-technology companies emerged.  Rochester, on the other hand,
saw a new crop of high-technology photonics companies emerge.  Their business model is built
around providing intellectual technology development related services to the large companies—a
departure from predecessor start-ups whose focus was on particular technologies.  By providing
intellectual services to the large companies, these companies are building the physical, human
and social capital necessary to develop their own products and successfully commercialize them.
While Akron’s Universities have recently turned their attention toward facilitating small company
start-ups, these companies lack this built in relationship to large companies and their distribution
channels.  Significant resources must therefore be devoted to establishing those linkages through
a concerted—and costly—effort.  
6. Conclusions
The findings of this research contribute to our understanding of how technologies and
institutions of mature or “rust-belt” regions can be adapted to make them more innovative
(Cooke 1995; Gertler 1993; Hudson 1998; Morgan 1997).  Research on industrial districts had
drawn attention to the key role of untraded interdependencies between local firms and other
organizations (Stoper 1995), involving informal inter-firm networking (Yeung 1994) and
processes of “collective learning” (Lorenz, 1992, Lazaric and Lorenz 1997).  Proponents of the
related concepts of “learning regions” (Asheim 1996; Morgan 1997; Florida 1996) and “local
innovation systems” (Cooke, Boekolt and Todtling 1998; Cooke, Uranga and Etxebarria 1998;
Cooke and Morgan 1998) have argued that what mature regions lack are institutions that can
help bridge among isolated actors in communities.  Utilizing the embeddedness of so-called
“third-party” organizations including government, training organizations, unions, development
agencies and universities are seen as key factors in the ability of regions to adapt and compete
effectively.   
To the degree that the approach struck by Akron resembled a “structural holes” perspective, the
data indicate this strategy failed.  This may have been the case for several reasons.  First, it may
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be that the key contribution made by the University of Rochester to entrepreneurship in the
Region was not to bridge the holes between university researchers and companies, but rather to
bridge them between small companies and large ones or, as seemed to be the case with respect
to Byelocorp, between actors inside the region and others outside it.  Possibly a more interesting
argument, however, comes out of the distinctions between different kinds of brokerage roles
made by Fernandez and Gould (1994).  It may be that universities should primarily see
themselves in a liaison position, rather than a representative one.  Akron’s problem may have
been that it asserted itself too forcefully in the process when compared to Rochester’s more
sotto voce approach.  Thus, in this sense, the research sheds light on how the state’s
embeddedness (Evans 1996) can best be wielded: that is, by acting behind the scenes as
facilitators of conversations rather than drivers of process.   
Most importantly, what this research shows is that communities can affect the tenor and
trajectory of regional economies through a concerted, organized, organizing approach.
Communities—even one’s stuck in the ‘rust belt’—need not be captives to economic fate and
inevitability.  Through strategic action they can and should take stewardship of its path.  
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TABLES
Table 1.  Industrial Organization of Companies, Akron and Rochester, 2003
Sources: Data from www.hoovers.com (based on Dun
and Brastreet data) and from www.referenceusa.com   
Polymers
Companies
in Akron
Opto-Electronics
Companies
in Rochester
Large Multinational Firms
Number 4 3
Average Age 99 years 122 years
Average Local Employment 1,304 16,650
Revenues $3,000 Million $9,500 Million
Local Patents (Since 1976) 3440 21,999
Total Patents (Since 1976) 6,445 30,595
% Local HQd 25% 66%
Small to Medium Sized
Technology-Based Firms
Number 15 33
Average Age 54 years 25 years
Average Local Employment 540 77
Average Revenues $950 Million $673 Million
Local Patents (Since 1976) 80 154
Total Patents (Since 1976) 1244
% Local HQd 45% 41%
Low-Technology Suppliers
and “Job Shops”
Number 190 89
Average Age 25 years 24 years
Average Employment 40 55
Average Revenues $1.3 Million $4.7 Million
Patents (Since 1976) Less than 1 157
% Local 85% 94%
Table 2.  Universities in Comparative Perspective
Year
Founded
Faculty Gradsand Post
Docs
Pubs
‘93-‘03 Patents
Industry
Funded
R&D (rank)
Total
R&D
(rank)
University of Rochester 1850 1,010 3,895 18,935 248 $7.7M (30) $197.0M(23)
• Institute of Optics 1929 25 103 749
• Laboratory for Laser
Energetics 1970 n/a n/a 653
• Center for Optics
Manufacturing n/a n/a n/a
• Theory Center for Optical
Science and Engineering 1995 8 19 n/a
Rochester Institute of Technology 1891 605 2,400 1,437 9 n/a $4.7M(292)
• Chester Carlson Center for
Imaging Science 1955 36 n/a 244
University of Akron 1870 777 3,973 3,582 191 $4.9M (144) $19.4m(197)
• Maurice Morton Institute of
Polymer Science 1956 21 150 498
• Department of Polymer
Science 1967 n/a 86 542
• Department of Polymer
Engineering 1982 n/a n/a 642
Kent State University 1910 144 n/a 2,986 48 n/a 10.8M(229)
• Center for Advanced Liquid
Crystal Display 1965 12 38 553
Sources: Publications: Science Citation Index; Patents, USPTO; R&D Spending: National Science Foundation and personal correspondence
Table 3.  Research Intensity by Major Industrial Categories, 2000
! millions of dollars
! R&D Spending Net Sales
As a percent of
Sales
All Industries 177,270 5,249,573 3.4%
Manufacturing 120,500 3,405,208 3.5%
Medical equipment 3,041 28,588 10.6%
Aerospace 14,742 141,548 10.4%
Navigational equipment 12,179 126,421 9.6%
Computers and electronic products 38,307 501,999 7.6%
Computers and peripherals 5,162 79,199 6.5%
Semiconductors and electrical components 10,909 172,363 6.3%
Communications equipment 7,381 116,792 6.3%
Other computer and electronic products 427 7,224 5.9%
Resin, synthetic rubber, fibers 2,852 50,637 5.6%
Chemicals 19,156 353,926 5.4%
Transportation equipment 32,458 749,851 4.3%
Machinery 6,082 170,276 3.6%
Basic chemicals 2,574 87,728 2.9%
Plastics and rubber products 1,670 91,243 1.8%
Appliances and components 2,434 164,385 1.5%
Fabricated metal 1,754 118,452 1.5%
Nonmetallic mineral products 651 46,002 1.4%
Textiles and apparel 370 35,137 1.1%
Beverage and tabacco 416 56,005 0.7%
Furniture 246 36,544 0.7%
Primary metals 695 122,752 0.6%
Wood products 65 13,527 0.5%
Food 1,227 310,802 0.4%
Petroleum and coal 1,005 353,210 0.3%
Source: National Science
Foundation
Table 4.  General Descriptive Statistics, Akron and Rochester, 2003
Source: Bureau of the Census, State and Metropolitan Area Data Book
†  Adjacent PMSAs: For Akron: Cleveland, Canton-Massillon, and
Youngstown-Warren; for Rochester: Buffalo-Niagara Falls and
Syracuse.
Akron Rochester
1980 2000 1980 2000
Population
(Percent of U.S)
660,334
(0.29%)
695,954
(0.25%)
1,032,224
(0.45%)
1,098,821
(0.39%)
Total Non-Farm
Employment
(Percent of U.S.)
299,410
(0.27%)
399,218
(0.24%)
507,978
(0.46%)
653,571
(0.40%)
Population including
adjacent MSAs†
(Percent of U.S.)
3,986,959
(1.75%)
3,986,959
(1.40%)
2,996,215
(1.32%)
3,000,240
(1.06%)
Per Capita Income
(U.S. Average)
$10,233
($10,183)
$31,091
($29,760)
$10,769
(105.4%)
$33,950
($29,760)
Annual Per Capita
Tax $273 $369
Population with
Bachelor’s Degrees
Percent of Population
Holding PhDs 6% 7%
Table 5.  Measures of Innovative Capacity
Akron Rochester NortheastUS Average
Percent of Employment
Located within 3 miles of
City Center
27.6% 33.7% 25.0%
Percent of Employment
Located within 10 miles
of City Center
66.3% 81.6% 66.3%
Catholics as a Percent of
All Religious Adherents 29% 33%
Gay and Lesbian
Households as a Percent
of all Households
0.78% 0.91% 0.85%
Locally Based Venture
Capital Funds 3 12
Sources: Catholic: Lilly Endowment American
Religion Archive (www.thearda.com). Gay Couples:
www.gaydemographics.org/.  Venture capital fund:
Thompson Financial.  Proximity: Glaeser, Kahn and
Chu (2001).  Demographics: U.S. Bureau of the
Census, State and Metropolitan Area Data Book
Table 6. Network Descriptive Statistics
† An author is counted once for each paper on which his or her name appears.
Akron Rochester
1980-82 2000-02 1980-82 2000-02
Number of
Organizations 85 100 104 249
Number of
Publications 236 166 198 516
Number of Authors† 661 668 764 2131
Number of Unique
Authors 463 377 465 795
Authors per
Publication 2.8 4.0 3.9 4.1
Authors per
Organization 7.8 6.7 7.3 8.5
Unique Authors per
Organization 5.4 3.8 4.5 3.2
Table 7. Selected Organizations Akron and Rochester, 1980-82 and 2000-02:
Total Number of Authors (with Rank) in order of “Betweenness” Centrality
Index Scores  
Akron Rochester
’80-‘82 ’80-‘82
Authors Centrality Authors Centrality
Babcock & Wilcox 54 (4) 40.1 Eastman Kodak 88 (3) 50.8
U. of Akron 64 (2) 34.2 Xerox Corp 183 (1) 40.7
BF Goodrich 180 (1) 31.3 U. of Rochester 172 (2) 19.7
US Navy 10 (6) 18.8 U. of Wisconsin 19 (4) 12.2
Goodyear 61 (3) 12.2 Bausch & Lomb 17 (6) 7.8
’00-‘02 ’00-‘02
Authors Centrality Authors Centrality
U. of Akron 113 (2) 33.2 Eastman Kodak 543 (1) 63.5
Goodyear 50 (4) 27.8 U. of Rochester 438 (2) 23.3
B.F. Goodrich 59 (3) Xerox Corp 142 (3) 13.2
Case Western Reserve 117 (1) 23.6 Bausch & Lomb 105 (4) 8.2
Bridgestone/Firestone 16 (7) 22.6 RIT 33 (5) 4.9
Table 8: Network Measures
Akron Rochester
1980-82 2000-02 1980-82 2000-02
Mean Distance
Between Nodes
(St. Dev)†
1.725
(0.37)
1.49
(0.54)
1.82
(0.76)
1.50
(0.61)
Maximum Distance 6 7 10 22
Mean Authors Per
Organization
(St. Dev)‡
22.59
(63.55)
26.14
(108.93)
22.67
(107.23)
41.89
(214.12)
Maximum Number of
Authors per
Organization
506
(Goodrich)
599
(U. Akron)
1286
(Kodak)
2118
(Kodak)
† The algorithm finds the # of edges in the strongest path between each pair of
nodes. The strength of a path is equal to the strength of its weakest link.
Table 9.a Akron 1980-1982: Truncated Block Model
Local
Multination
al
Local
Tech
Firms
Local
Universities
and Labs
Non-Local
Multination
al
U.S. Tech
Firms
U.S.
Universities
and Labs
Non-U.S.
Tech
Firms
Non-U.S.
Universities
and Labs
n _
2
d.f.
Local
Multinationals 86.1% _ 0.1% 0.4% 0.8% 2.5% 9.5% 0.2% 0.5% 1277 5
Local Tech
Firms
1.7% 95.0% _ 3.3% 60 5
Local Univs
and Labs
2.4% 77.6% 1.0% _ 2.4% _ 8.1% 1.0% 7.6% 210 5
Category
Total
71.4% _ 3.7% _ 10.9% _ 2.4% ‡ 9.0% _ 0.3% _ 0.3% _  1.5% 5
Group Total 86.0% _ 12.2% 1.7%
1547
2
_ — significantly different from Rochester
Table 9.b Akron 2000-2002: Truncated Block Model
Local
Multination
al
Local
Tech
Firms
Local
Universities
and Labs
Non-Local
Multination
al
U.S. Tech
Firms
U.S.
Universities
and Labs
Non-U.S.
Tech
Firms
Non-U.S.
Universities
and Labs
n _
2
d.f.
Local
Multinationals 62.3% ‡ 3.7% 5.2% 8.1% 10.6% 3.1% _‡ 7.1% 621 5
Local Tech
Firms 64.8% _‡ 6.0% 3.8% _ 3.3% _ 17.3% _ 4.9% 369 5
Local Univs
and Labs 2.1% 2.0% _‡ 77.1% 5.3% _‡ 3.5% 6.2% 0.5% _ 3.2% 1091 5
Category
Total
19.7% _‡ 12.5% _‡ 42.6% _‡ 5.0% _‡ 4.8% _‡ 9.5% 1.2% _‡ 4.7% 5
Group Total 74.8% _‡ 19.3% _‡ 5.9% _‡
2081
2
 ‡ — significant change from 1980-1982
 _ — significantly different from Rochester
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Table 9.c Rochester 1980-1982: Truncated Block Model
Local
Multinational
Local
Tech
Firms
Local
Universities
and Labs
Non-Local
Multinational
U.S.
Tech
Firms
U.S.
Universities
and Labs
Non-U.S.
Tech
Firms
Non-U.S.
Universities
and Labs
n _
2
d.f.
Local
Multinationals 66.7% _ 0.3% 2.8% 1.6% 2.4% 21.8% 0.1% _ 0.1% 1359 5
Local Tech
Firms
8.5% _ 57.4% _ 6.4% 6.4% 21.3% 47 5
Local Univs
and Labs
2.9% 77.1% 1.6% _ 0.1% _ 15.5% 2.8% 1310 5
Category
Total 34.9% _ 1.1% _ 38.6% _ 1.7% 1.3% _ 18.7% _ >0.1% _ 3.5% 5
Group Total 74.7% 21.8% 3.6%
1547
2
_ — significantly different from Akron
Table 9.d Rochester 2000-2002: Truncated Block Model
Local
Multination
al
Local
Tech
Firms
Local
Universities
and Labs
Non-Local
Multination
al
U.S.
Tech
Firms
U.S.
Universities
and Labs
Non-U.S.
Tech
Firms
Non-U.S.
Universities
and Labs
n _
2
d.f.
Local
Multinationals
68.2% 1.3% 7.6% 1.3% 2.1% 11.3% 0.3% ‡ 7.8% 2847 5
Local Tech
Firms 7.0% _ 62.3% _ 8.0% ‡ 0.6% _ 0.8% _ 16.1% 1.1% _ 4.2% 528 5
Local Univs
and Labs
8.3% 1.6% _‡ 77.7% 1.2% 1.1% ‡ 5.1% ‡ 1.1% _‡ 3.8% 2575 5
Category
Total 36.9% _ 6.9% _‡ 37.9% _ 1.2% _ 1.5% _ 9.1% ‡ 0.7% _‡ 5.7% ‡ 5
Group Total 81.7% _‡ 11.8% _‡ 6.5% ‡
5950
2
‡ — significant change from 1980-1982
_ — significantly different from Akron
Table 10.  Indicators of Entrepreneurship
Polymers, Specialty Chemicals and
Advanced Materials Optics, Photonics and Lasers
Akron Total Polymers Rochester Total Optics
SBIR/STTR Awards, 1983-2003
Number 9 1796 45 6241
Percent of
Total  0.5%  0.7%
New Venture Oriented Venture Capital, 1973-2002
Amount
($000s) $ 122,063 $ 2,505,730 $ 103,440 $ 1,066,303
Percent of
Total 4.9% 9.7%
Sources: SBIR: U.S. Department of Commerce; Venture Capital: Thompson Financial.
GRAPHS
Graph 1a.  Geographic distribution optics patent inventors, 1976-2002
Source: USPTO. Optical electronics are defined as the following patent series: 347,
Incremental printing of symbolic information, 351-359, optics, 382, image analysis, 385,
optical waveguides, 396, photography, and 399 Electrophotography.  Data reflect
inventors of patents whose addresses are in the given geographic areas.
Graph 1b.  Number and Geographic Distribution of Polymers Patents, 1976-2002
Source: USPTO.  Polymers are defined as the following patent series: 156, Adhesive
Bonding and Miscellaneous, 264, Plastic and Nonmetallic Shaping, 265 Plastic Article
Shaping, 427 Coating Processes and 521-528 Synthetic Resins or Natural Rubbers.  Data
reflect inventors of patents whose addresses are in the given geographic areas.
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Figure 1.  Northeast United States Highlighting Akron and Rochester
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Figure 2.  Polymers Industry Supply
Chain
Figure 3.  Optoelectronics Industry Supply Chain
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